While the Muslim Brotherhood gets all the ink, the Salafists go on a rampage.
By PAUL MARSHALL
Judging the likely trajectory of post-Mubarak Egypt requires
assessing the depth of public support for Islamism, and usually this has
meant assessing the strength and intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood.
While the Brotherhood remains central, however, the country is also
facing a frequently violent upsurge of Salafist versions of Islam.
Protesters in Qena gather to oppose the seating of a Christian governor, April 22
Newscom
The
groups can overlap, but the Brotherhood tends to stress an Islamic
state and political organization, and its members have no prescribed
mode of dress, apart from modesty: In this sense they are a modern
movement. The Salafists are often distinguishable by full beards for men
and full face covering for women, and they stress emulating the piety
and practice of the first three generations of Muslims (Salaf means “predecessor” or “forefather”).
Strongly influenced by Wahhabi teachings, the Salafists have tended
to follow local sheikhs rather than have a countrywide organization, and
under Mubarak they were usually quiescent or else inclined to a violent
extremism that led to rapid and severe repression by the regime’s
efficient security apparatus. But many Salafists are now trying to take
advantage of the widespread chaos in Egypt in order to impose their
repressive version of Islam on their neighbors and ultimately on the
country.
One Salafist target is Egypt’s Christians, the Copts, the largest
non-Muslim minority in the Middle East. On March 20, in Qena, Salafists,
including an off-duty policeman, accused a Copt named Ayman Mitri of
renting an apartment to a prostitute, cut off one of his ears, mutilated
his other ear, and slashed his neck. The attackers then informed the
police that they had carried out the punishment required by Islamic law.
As was usual under Mubarak, the police refrained from pressing charges
and called for a “reconciliation” meeting between the religious
communities.
Also as under Mubarak, the authorities’ refusal to punish attacks on
Christians has led to more attacks. On March 23, Salafists surrounded
St. George’s church in Beni Ahmad and successfully demanded that a
church expansion approved by the government be stopped. On March 27,
they blockaded St. Mary’s church in Giza, saying it did not have a
permit. After yet another “reconciliation” meeting between Copts and
Muslims, services at the church were forbidden until it acquired a new
permit.
On March 28, Salafists attacked a liquor store in Kasr El-Bassil
owned by a Copt, destroyed other stores, and demanded that coffee shops
be closed. One villager was killed and eight others injured. On April 5,
hundreds occupied St. John the Beloved church in Kamadeer, stopping
repairs after heavy rain, and told Copts that they were not allowed to
pray there any more. After yet another “reconciliation,” Copts were told
to build a church 200 meters away, one without a dome, cross, bell, or
any other external feature marking it as a church.
Beginning on April 15, over 10,000 demonstrators, mostly Salafists,
protested in the southern province of Qena against the appointment of a
new governor, Emad Mikhail, who is a Christian (the previous governor,
Magdy Ayoub, was also Christian). Protesters blocked main roads, stopped
buses to separate men and women passengers, and disrupted the main rail
route in Upper Egypt for eight days. There were threats to bar Mikhail
from the province and even to kill him.
Some protesters were concerned simply that the new governor, like so
many others appointed throughout the country in recent years, had no
experience and was being rewarded for previous service to the regime.
But Salafist concerns soon dominated, with one speaker complaining, “A
Copt won’t implement Islamic law,” and demonstrators chanting, “We will
never be ruled by a Christian governor” and “Mikhail is an infidel pig.”
There were also declarations that Qena was an “Islamic Emirate.”
Tensions ran so high that local Christians stayed inside and couldn’t
celebrate Palm Sunday. The armed forces refused to intervene, and,
although Egypt’s cabinet initially rejected calls for the governor’s
resignation, on April 25, Prime Minister Essam Sheraf surrendered and
said he would “freeze” the appointment for three months.
Salafists are also attacking other Muslims. On March 30, one killed a
Muslim colleague for not praying at the requisite time. They also
target Sufi mosques and shrines, because Salafists regard veneration of
saints as heretical. Since Mubarak stepped down, dozens of shrines on
the outskirts of Cairo have been burned or have simply disappeared, and
there have been attacks throughout Alexandria and in Beheira and
Monufiya. In turn, leaders of Sufi orders have threatened to attack
those destroying shrines, especially the shrines belonging to the
prophet’s family. Sheikh Gaber Kasem al-Kholy, the highest-ranking Sufi
in Alexandria, declared in early April, “I don’t underestimate people’s
fears concerning Salafists. Of course, Coptic Christians are a main
target for those extremists, but we need to speak out about the
suffering of the Sufi people.”
Egypt’s small Shiite community is another target. Shiite leader
Mohamed al-Derini has denounced the attacks, and some Shiites believe
that the Saudis also bear responsibility for the violence. During the
demonstrations in Qena, some demonstrators waved Saudi flags. It is also
rumored that the Saudis fund the Salafists, and this, coming on top of
the Saudis’ support for Mubarak and their condemnations of Shiites,
Sufis, and shrines, has increased tensions. On April 9, Shiites
protested at the Saudi embassy in Cairo and waved banners denouncing
Saudi fatwas that condemn Shiites and permit the demolition of
shrines, as well as the kingdom’s rejection of calls to prosecute ousted
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. One banner read: “You defended
Mubarak, pushed Salafis to sow sedition, and pressed for not trying the
tyrant.”
Some Salafists joined the demonstrations in Tahrir Square, and others
have said they will enter politics—in many cases by supporting the
Brotherhood. Often the two groups have been opposed to one another, with
the Salafists accusing the Brotherhood of compromise, but in the March
19 constitutional referendum, Salafi clerics urged their followers to
support the Brotherhood in campaigning for a “yes” vote.
Perhaps thinking that these more extreme Islamist currents make it
appear relatively moderate, the Brother-hood condemned the killing of
Osama bin Laden. Already before that, it had become more outspoken about
its own desire for an Islamic state.
On April 14, at a forum in Cairo, the Brotherhood’s deputy supreme
guide, Mahmoud Ezzat, said his group wanted to establish an Islamic
state when they achieved sufficient support through their Freedom and
Justice party. At the same forum, another Brotherhood leader, Saad
al-Husseiny, stated that they aimed to apply Islamic law and establish
Islamic rule. On April 22, a senior spokesman, Sobhi Saleh, said the
Brotherhood wished to apply “Islamic legislation.”
There is some ambiguity in these remarks, and, after an outcry from
other parties, one leading Brotherhood figure, Hamdi Hassan, said the
statements were nothing new and that reaction had been inflamed by
inaccurate press reports. Ezzat filed a complaint with the attorney
general, accusing the media of twisting his remarks.
These newer statements about Islam and law by senior leaders of the
Brotherhood have alarmed democracy activists and many -others. In
response, the Coptic Orthodox Church suspended its dialogue with the
Brotherhood and dropped its plans to invite the group’s leaders to
attend Easter celebrations. The state-run daily Rose Al-Youssef,
meanwhile, under the headline “A state of terror follows Salafi
threats,” reported Salafists’ warnings that they will attack women who
do not wear the full face covering called the niqab, while
schools have had high absence rates and have sometimes closed because of
fears of sectarian violence. The combination of these Islamist currents
poses a growing threat to a free Egypt.
On April 28, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
for the first time recommended to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
that Egypt be labeled a “Country of Particular Concern (CPC).” This
designation refers, as commission chair Leonard Leo noted, to “the
world’s worst religious freedom violators and human rights abusers.” He
added,
Severe religious freedom violations engaged in or
tolerated by the government [of Egypt] have increased dramatically since
the release of last year’s report, with violence, including murder,
escalating against Coptic Christians and other religious minorities.
Since President Mubarak’s resignation from office in February, such
violence continues unabated without the government’s bringing the
perpetrators to justice.
Paul Marshall is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center
for Religious Freedom and coauthor, with Nina Shea, of the forthcoming Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide.
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